This paper represents an effort to review the history of the various conceptualizations of schizophrenia as a mental disorder, and to summarize issues concerning diagnosis and etiology. The question of biologically based diagnosis is considered.
Introduction
Much of the difficulty in studying the schizophrenic disorders is that they are diagnosed on the basis of phenomenology. Inasmuch as we do not have a diagnostic system based on etiology and pathogenesis, we must be even more precise in our conceptualization of these disorders. The focus of this review is on the older literature concerning conceptualization, and what is known about etiology. This older literature is currently much neglected, despite the fact that it frequently benefits from containing data on neuroleptic-free patients.
The theoretical conceptualization of the schizophrenic disorders has vital implications for every aspect of our clinical work: understanding is shaped by implicit and explicit assumptions, schizophrenia being no exception. The major assumption in this paper is that the schizophrenic disorders constitute a heterogeneous syndrome. It is also assumed that this represents a group of disorders that have certain phenomenological features in common, but differ as to etiology, pathogenesis, clinical picture, and response to treatment. While there are phenomenological similarities that allow the creation of a nosologic category of illness, the phenomenology is not a basis for the creation of a biologically homogeneous classification. While the 'classical disease entity' approach is too static to lend itself to an understanding of the schizophrenic disorders, we must recognize that these are genuine illnesses with biological as well as social contributions.
Conceptual models
Historically, there have been three conceptual models of schizophrenia. Kraepelin best reflected the 'disease entity' model, which derived from the excitement of the late 19th century understanding of infectious disease. Kraepelin [1] attempted to create not merely a clinical nosology, but a true classification of mental disorders that was able to predict outcome. He utilized a variety of clinical criteria in order to group patients into what he hoped to be more homogeneous categories. The important division vis-à-vis schizophrenia was the grouping of what Kraeplin termed 'illogical disorders' into a single category, which was then subdivided into those subjects that tended to deteriorate and those that did not. Those that tended to deteriorate were labeled as having 'dementia praecox', and those that did not were labeled as having 'manicdepressive psychosis'. However, outcome does not serve well as a classificatory principle [2,3]. There are really only four possible outcomes for a medical condition: death, recovery, chronicity, and recovery with relapse. Inasmuch as most psychiatric disorders are not inherently lethal, there are only three available outcomes for psychiatric illness. These are not predetermined, but rather are a function of the balance between the adaptive demands on the individual and the adaptive resources available to that person. Finally, outcome is not univariate: it can be measured in terms of employment, education, social adaptation, etc. In other words, there are many parameters that contribute to the concept of outcome which go beyond the relative presence or absence of symptoms.
Eugen Bleuler [4] , though a contemporary of Kraepelin, differed significantly in his conceptualization of the schizophrenic disorders. Most importantly, he did not believe that dementia praecox represented a single disease entity. He argued that the onset was variable and did not necessarily occur during adolescence, and that the outcome was also variable, not inevitably leading to dementia. He insisted that the cases represented a group of disorders that differed as to etiology, pathogenesis, and outcome, but which had certain fundamental clinical features in common. These clinical features included autism, ambivalence, associational disturbances, and affective disturbances. These altered fundamental signs were a consequence of the splitting that he considered to be the theoretical basis for the group of disorders. Bleuler felt that there was a fundamental loss of harmony between various mental functions, and that this represented a splitting of the integrity of the mind. He also attempted to bring in some of the dynamic considerations of his other contemporary, Sigmund Freud.
Adolph Meyer [5] carried the Bleulerian approach even further, conceptualizing the disorders as reactions. He argued that predispositions were biological, but that life events then played the critical role of turning these predispositions into actual illness. Meyer emphasized the interaction between biological givens and environmental experiences. He also saw these disorders as a syndrome.
Diagnostic approaches
The Kraepelinian approach to diagnosis was rather narrow and empirical. There were no pathognomonic findings, but rather descriptions of 'typical' cases that the clinician could then utilize. The emphasis on cognitive deterioration narrowed the diagnosis significantly. This approach was more popular in central Europe than in western Europe or the US.
Bleuler's approach was much more popular in the US. As indicated earlier, it was based on a theory, and this theory determined the fundamental altered signs which reflected the fragmentation of the harmony that, he believed, should be present in the mind. In practice, the altered thinking and formal signs of thought disorder were utilized for many years in the US as the criteria for making the diagnosis. They were included in the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual [6] of the American Psychiatric Association. Bleuler's diagnostic criteria tended to broaden the category. Since the signs were not reliable, different observers would disagree as to whether particular signs, such as ambivalence, were of sufficient severity to warrant a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Similarly, autism and ambivalence are present in all humans to a greater or lesser degree. Defining the exact point at which the normal shades into schizophrenia is highly subjective. Moreover, illogical thinking is not restricted to schizophrenics, and affective disturbances can be found in many individuals and conditions. Langfeldt [7] also based his diagnostic system on empiricism. He separated the conditions of patients into 'true' schizophrenia and 'schizophreniform disorders'. The patients with true schizophrenia had symptoms such as depersonalization, autism, and emotional blunting. As was the case with Bleuler's method, there was poor reliability in Langfeldt's approach because of the high degree of inference that had to be drawn in order to make a diagnosis.
Schneider [8] also approached the problem of diagnosis empirically. He took a large group of hospitalized patients about whom there was diagnostic agreement, and studied their records to identify the symptoms that were of first rank in importance in reaching this level of clinical agreement. A problem with this approach is that one manifestation or sign is as good as any other. The approach increases reliability, but does not deal with the problem of validity.
The diagnostic approaches described above all suffer from being cross-sectional in nature, whereas the best diagnosis comes from the study of the patient over a long period of time. Unfortunately, the demands of clinical reality often do not permit such an approach. Another disadvantage of these various systems is that they use multiple criteria rather than a single pathognomonic sign. The advantage of the single criterion is that it will give increased reliability. There is evidence that using formal signs of thought disorder as the single diagnostic criterion leads to a population that is more homogeneous as to premorbid adjustment, onset, and duration of hospital stay [9] . Nevertheless, there is no independent validation for a phenomenological approach, irrespective of whether single or multiple criteria are used. There is an inherent circularity to this phenomenological method. Patients are grouped on the basis of the presence of one or more of a group of symptoms, and then the group of patients is studied and it is revealed that those are the symptoms that are present. All of our phenomenologically based diagnostic efforts are also limited because we strive for inter-rater agreement, yet such agreement bears no necessary relationship to construct validity. It is possible to identify signs and symptoms that have good inter-rater reliability, as was demonstrated in the World Health Organization International Pilot Study [10] , but that does not address the question of validity.
Premorbid history
There is no single personality type that predisposes to a schizophrenic illness, although premorbid schizoid and autistic tendencies carry a worse prognosis [11, 12] . Careful study of patients' early history reveals that they frequently have had microepisodes some years before the actual decompensation. These microepisodes, when present, are brief and usually appear to be transient neurotic events that encapsulate features of the later psychotic decompensation.
Stress
The concept of stress derives from engineering, where it was defined as a force that tends to deform a body. This concept has been borrowed by a number of fields, including psychiatry. In psychiatry, stress is usually conceptualized as an external event which causes distress. It is more accurately conceptualized as any adaptive challenge. A problem with the broad definition of any adaptive challenge is that it loses any specificity. In actual practice, the search has been for stresses that can precipitate illness in most, if not all, individuals. Scales have been developed to quantify the stress experienced by an individual during a particular time period [13] . There is evidence that stressful events play a role in precipitating schizophrenic decompensations, in that they tend to be more frequent in the period immediately prior to such a decompensation [14] [15] [16] . Nevertheless, subclinical symptoms may themselves produce the stressful life events.
Social class
There is a relationship between the social class of patients and the prevalence of schizophrenia in large urban areas [17, 18] . The most likely explanation for this finding is downward drift following the precipitation of illness [19] . There does not appear to be a relationship between the social class of the patient's family of origin and the prevalence rates, but, rather, schizophrenia results, particularly in males, in downward social drift. Obviously, the stresses of lower-class life may well play a role in sustaining the illness once the person has decompensated.
Season of birth
It has been shown that children born during the winter months from January to April in the Northern Hemisphere have a statistically higher rate of schizophrenia than those born throughout the remainder of the year [20] [21] [22] . This finding has been replicated for the winter months of the Southern Hemisphere. The most likely explanation is that the intrauterine environment is stressed during that period in such a way as to contribute to an increased prevalence rate for schizophrenia. Advocates of a viral basis for schizophrenia point to these winter birth data as being supportive of their hypothesis, but this explanation for the condition is very controversial.
Family studies
The early concept of a schizophrenogenic mother was very damaging to the scientific development of family studies [23] . Nevertheless, efforts were made to look at familial patterns in child rearing and in communication. These studies were suggestive that particular families were contributing to the pathology of their offspring [24] [25] [26] [27] . There are many difficulties with such studies, not the least of which is that the offspring affects the parents. How the parent relates to a child is not independent of the child's behavior and relatedness. In addition, there may well be genetic predispositions in the parents which have not manifested themselves in frank illness, but which have still caused them to be less than optimal in their rearing and communication patterns.
The work on expressed emotion has been more scientifically rigorous [28, 29] . Basically, it has demonstrated that the relapse rate in a schizophrenic illness is affected by the emotional climate in the home. Parents who are critical or hostile toward their child with a schizophrenic illness play a role in the relapse rate for that illness. Either reducing the contact between the patient and the parents, or reducing the hostility of the parents through family education has positive effects on the relapse rate.
Consanguinity
The first consanguinity study on schizophrenia was conducted in 1916 by Rudin [30] . Many studies have been done in the intervening years to look at the effect of consanguinity on the rates of illness [31, 32] . It is clear that being a first-degree relative of a schizophrenic increases the likelihood of an individual being schizophrenic by roughly a factor of 10. The consanguinity studies merely show that schizophrenia runs in families. It should be noted, however, that the vast majority of people diagnosed with schizophrenia have no firstdegree relatives who are so diagnosed. A major limitation to the consanguinity studies and, for that matter, all of the genetic studies, is that in order to be admitted to the study, the patient must first become clinically ill. If it is recognized that the genetic factor is a predisposition, then our inability to identify those who have the predisposition but who do not become ill skews the cohort to an unknown extent.
Studies on twins
The existence of monozygotic and dizygotic twins constitutes a form of natural experiment. Fraternal twins are no more alike genetically than are ordinary siblings, whereas identical twins share the same initial genome. By comparing the concordance rate of schizophrenia in monozygotic twins with that of dizygotic twins, one can find out if the degree of genetic overlap contributes to vulnerability to illness. It must be emphasized that the size of the concordance rate is not a factor. If the monozygotic twin rate is significantly higher than the dizygotic rate, that is evidence for a genetic role in transmission. Studies on twins have consistently demonstrated more than a threefold difference in rate between monozygotes and dizygotes [33, 34] . It is important to state, however, that being a twin does not increase the likelihood of developing a schizophrenic illness.
There are many limitations to the studies on twins. Most monozygotic twins are raised in a much more homogeneous environment and are frequently dressed alike and mistaken for one another. There have been problems in the sampling of the twin populations [35] . The determination of zygosity has often been based on the degree to which they look alike [36] . The limitations in our diagnostic methods are obviously a limiting factor in these studies. The halo effect can play a role in monozygotic twins. There are also developmental issues because monozygotic twins tend to have lower birth weights and more perinatal morbidity [37] . Nevertheless, the data on twins have been quite consistent in suggesting a meaningful role for genetic factors in vulnerability. This conclusion has been supported by those cases of separated identical twins who have approximately the same concordance rate as those who are reared together [38] .
Adoption studies
The first such study was done by Heston [39] , but it suffered from a number of methodological deficiencies, which were addressed by Kety and Rosenthal [40] [41] [42] in Danish studies. Two approaches were used in Denmark. The first was to identify schizophrenic parents who had given their children up for adoption, and then to look for the rate of schizophrenia in those children who had been raised by non-schizophrenic families. The second approach was to take all children who had been adopted during a period of time, and divide them into those who had become schizophrenic and those who had not.
Then, one could look at the rates of schizophrenia in the adoptive and biological relatives of the adoptees who were schizophrenic, and compare these with the rates for the relatives of adoptees who were not schizophrenic. Both of these approaches converged upon the conclusion that what mattered for the onset of a schizophrenic illness was who bore the child and not who reared the child.
Diathesis
The schizophrenic illness is not transmitted genetically. The only thing that can be transmitted is the predisposing capacity for that particular form of illness, should the individual decompensate into a psychosis. Recognizing this fact means that the genetic predisposition need not be a mutant gene. In fact, it may not even require any genetic abnormality; rather, a statistically unusual gene pattern may be involved. It is important to note that relatives of those with schizophrenia are not at increased risk for serious mental illness, but rather are at increased risk for schizophrenia. For example, among surgical patients, there is no increased risk of schizophrenia above the population rate, but, when depression, manic depression, schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder are added, the overall rate for serious psychopathology is not different from that seen in the relatives of patients with schizophrenia [43] . The relatives of patients with schizophrenia have an increased rate of schizophrenia, but lower rates of other forms of serious psychopathology. The most reasonable conclusion is that the factors transmitted genetically are not predisposing to serious illness, but, rather, to the form which that serious illness will take, should it occur.
Conclusion
This review attempts to draw upon an older and frequently ignored literature that helps to underline the ambiguity in our understanding of the schizophrenic illnesses. An effort has been made to show that the problem of phenomenologically based diagnosis underlies most of our difficulties. The need to move towards a medical diagnosis based on etiopathogenesis, and the ability to identify pathological markers that will allow us to identify people who are at risk, but not clinically ill, would resolve most of the ambiguities identified in this paper.
